SECTION II. ANATOMY OF A FAILURE: BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
Since many causal mechanisms are transdomain in nature and appear in different problem areas, we avoid duplication and use the cumulative principle of presentation in a flexible (non-linear) form: each mechanism is introduced and defined where it is most fully and clearly revealed, after which it is considered applicable (in many cases) to other domains without re-telling. The order of sections reflects the logic of presentation of the material and the convenience of explanation, and not the hierarchy of importance of reasons; in subsequent sections we add mainly domain-specific conditions and forms of manifestation of the already introduced mechanisms. For this reason, the same mechanism can be key for several topics at once (for example, for corruption, wars, environmental and social crises), but will be mentioned only once - in the place where it is methodologically and empirically most justified
1. POWER: STATES IN THE SERVICE OF INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
NARRATIVE (How we used to explain it):,
The state serves to protect and prosper citizens, being the foundation of civilization. Corruption is a painful but incidental anomaly, and the possibility that leaders may pursue private interests is perceived as something secondary and incidental. The institutional system as a whole is reliable and blocks the most destructive forms of arbitrary government.
However, reality demonstrates that these institutional giants often turn into instruments for serving the interests of small groups, directing the development of society towards private gain. The key nodes of civilization actually serve purposes diametrically opposed to the public good.
Abuses are reproduced even with formal “checks and balances”: the problem areas lie deeper - in the nature of power, in the psychology and biology of behavior, and in the limitations of accountability systems.
“Even with increased knowledge of power’s corrupting effect and safeguards put in place to counteract such tendencies, power abuse remains rampant in society suggesting that the full extent of this effect is not well understood” (Tobore, O. O., 2023).
“Corruption, generally defined as abuse of entrusted power for private gain, is one of the most widespread social problems (Hu et al., 2021, translation mine)”
“Survival in power is the primary goal of political leaders. … Leaders strive to maintain political power and choose policies that create a set of private and public goods that serve as the basis for their retention in power…. “Free” resources allow leaders with small coalitions to suppress coordination goods and resist democratization... The mechanism through which leaders use such resources for survival has detrimental consequences for political and economic development. … Leaders choose policies and perhaps institutional changes to mitigate the risks of losing power. Leaders with access to “free” resources… usually best enhance their chances of survival by reducing coordination goods… which is often accompanied by authoritarianization—a reduction in the size of the ruling coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A., 2009, my translation).
REAL REASON – SAPIEN PROBLEM:
Neurobiological deformation – power as a source of self-oriented, selfish behavior:
“Power is an all-pervasive, and fundamental force… Power has a monumental effect on the behavior of the powerholder \[2,48\]. The corrupting effect of power is well known… Having power affects the human body physiologically, neurologically, and psychologically. Power is linked with neurological alterations in the brain” (Tobore, O. O., 2023).
1.1 Power enhances selfishness, creates greed and a sense of superiority
“Power reinforces the tendency for self-oriented goals to lead to selfish behavior \[104\]” (Tobore, O. O., 2023, my translation).
“Power breeds a sense of superiority \[ 100 \] and those with power are often unaware of their violation of basic principles of justice \[ 25\]. Evidence from fMRI experiments suggests that power generates greed by increasing aversion to receiving less than others and decreasing aversion to receiving more than others \[101\]. Power holders, especially self-centered individuals, showed decreased activity in the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, indicating weaker self-inhibition when processing information about getting more than others \[101\]. The need for power is significantly and positively correlated with narcissism. Power increases the tendency for self-centered goals to lead to selfish behavior \[ 104 \] and can cause people to act unethically in their own self-interest \[ 50–52, 105\]. …Power makes those with power feel special, invincible, and above the rules. ... High levels of power are associated with increased interest in rewards, while low levels of power are accompanied by increased attention to the interests of others \[2,[48](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov /articles/PMC10461512/#cit0048),85\]" (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
“Power promotes feelings of entitlement \[100\] and powerholders are not often cognizant of their violation of basic fairness principles \[25\]. Evidence from experiments using fMRI indicates that power promotes greed by increasing aversion to receiving less than others and reducing aversion to receiving more than others \[101\]. Powerholders, particularly pro-self-individuals, displayed decreased response in the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, indicating a weaker restrain of self-interest when processing receiving more than others \[101\]. The need for power is significantly and positively correlated with narcissism \[102,103\]. invincible, and above the rules… Elevated power is associated with heightened interest in rewards while low power is associated with increased attention to the interest of others \[2,48,85\]” (Tobore, O. O.2023).
Power shifts the balance towards the approach system (BAS) – reward focus, automaticity, disinhibition: “We hypothesize that power activates the behavioral approach system without conscious awareness of its effects. Increased power, we hypothesize, implies a reward-rich environment and freedom and, as a consequence, triggers approach-related positive affect, attention to rewards, automatic cognition, and disinhibited behavior. ..." (Keltner et al., 2003, my translation).
“Indeed, the authorities are launching a system of behavioral approach \[ 2, 25 \]…. Low levels of social power, compared with high or neutral levels of power, are associated with a significant decrease in activity in the left frontal cortex \[ 26 \]" (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
“Indeed, power triggers the behavioral approach system \[2,25\]… Low social power state compared to high or neutral power is associated with significantly reduced left-frontal cortical activity \[Citation26\]” (Tobore, O. O. 2023).
“Behavioral evidence shows that upper-class people behave more unethically than lower-class people. They were more likely to break the law while driving, were more likely to make unethical decisions, steal valuables from others, lie in negotiations, cheat to increase their chances of winning, and endorse unethical behavior at work. Evidence from mediators and moderators showed that the unethical tendencies of upper-class people are partly explained by their more favorable attitudes toward greed” (Piff et al., 2012, my translation).
1.2. Lack of complete immunity
“Another key conclusion of this article is that no person is completely “immune” to the corrupting effects of power. Results from a laboratory experiment show that power amplifies people's dispositions: people with power and a strong moral identity are less likely to act in their own self-interest compared to those with a less stable moral identity (DeCelles et al., 2012).” (Tobore, O. O., 2023, my translation).”
1.3. Power worsens cooperation
“EEG results show that power “distorts” balanced cooperation by reducing the motivation of the power holder to cooperate with subordinates (Kanso et al., 2014). … Also, power … is associated with devaluing or ignoring advice due to overconfidence (See et al., 2011; Fast et al., 2012; Tost et al., 2012), as well as with less trust (Schilke et al., 2015), and this can impair cooperation” (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
“People with power may actually be less aware of others (less attentive)” (Keltner et al., 2003, my translation).
1.4. Power reduces empathy
High power priming significantly reduces motor resonance when observing the actions of another person (a change in the motor-cortical response associated with the activity of the mirror system of the brain and underlying empathy). This is interpreted as a decrease in interpersonal sensitivity and is described as a basic/automatic (default) effect of power (Hogeveen et al., 2014).
“Responses to individual suffering are the basis of cooperative communities. Participants with a higher sense of power experienced less compassion and also demonstrated higher autonomous emotion regulation when faced with another participant's suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008).
“The assumption is that power causes people to become too fixated on their own point of view, without being sufficiently attuned to the perspectives of others. Participants high in power were less accurate in identifying other people's emotional expressions; these results indicate a power-induced barrier to empathy. In all of these studies, power was associated with a reduced tendency to understand how other people see, think, and feel” (Galinsky et al., 2006, my translation).
A negative relationship was found between individual differences in the degree of power and perspective taking (the ability to mentally put oneself in the place of another person)” (Galinsky et al., 2006, my translation). In other words, the higher a sapiens' sense of power over others in everyday life, the lower his ability to understand other people's points of view.
1.5. Power promotes dehumanization
“Power promotes dehumanization—the process of denying other people key components of “humanity” and perceiving them as animals or objects, while powerlessness leads to self-dehumanization. Power promotes the objectification of others and increases the tendency to humiliate and harm them, including bullying, autocratic behavior and manipulation \[123–125\].
Also, a high level of power is associated with manipulative and contemptuous behavior towards people with a low level of power - through devaluing their importance/value (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
1.6. Addictive nature of power
There is evidence of power addiction stemming from celebrity status and fame. The addictive effect of power on the person endowed with it increases the need to make efforts to maintain and accumulate power \[57–59\]. Aging, envy and fear - both conscious and unconscious - of retribution for past actions can contribute to the “addiction” of power. Efforts to permanently retain power play a key role in the practice of nepotism, factional struggle among powerful elites, crownism and dynastic transfer of power \[60–62\]” (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
1.7. Natural selection – narcissists and psychopathy
“Power hierarchies and pyramidal forms of leadership... attract narcissistic individuals (Zitek & Jordan, 2016)... Grandiose narcissists are more likely to seek and achieve positions of power in organizations (Wille et al., 2013; Brunell et al., 2008; Rovelli & Curnis, 2021; O'Reilly & Pfeffer, 2021; Nevicka & Sedikides, 2021), but they are more likely to abuse power and pursue self-interest to the detriment of the organization (O’Reilly & Chatman, 2020; Nevicka et al., 2011; Braun, 2017; Nevicka et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017)” (Tobore, O. O. 2023, my translation).
“Psychopath: a person with a self-centered and antisocial personality characterized by a lack of remorse for his actions, a lack of empathy for others, and often criminal tendencies” (Merriam-Webster, 2026).
“Psychopathy is positively associated with leadership charisma and influence as a component of overall charisma. ... Charisma moderated the relationship between psychopathic traits and successful evasion of detection (avoiding detection of psychopathic traits) and punishment. … The relationship between psychopathic traits and successful avoidance of sanctions for deviant behavior was stronger in individuals with high charisma (Welsh & Lenzenweger, 2021, my translation).
Psychopathic traits have been associated with higher scores on scales of charisma and presentation style, but with poorer scores as a team player, a weaker management style, and lower overall performance scores (Babiak et al., 2010).
These qualities—presentation, charisma, confidence, rhetoric—play a key role in politics, where objective performance metrics are lacking and competition for the attention of voters and elites dominates.
However, testing for psychopathy for civil service is not a standard or widespread practice in the world.
1.8. Power inspires trust:
Credibility is a resource of power, and power, in turn, increases perceived authority compared to those who have less power (Nesler et al., 1993; Smolnikov, 2018). Statements or statements made by a person of power or high status are usually respected." (Tobore, 2023).
1.9. Structural limits of accountability:
“In most social systems, people lower in the power structure can only get wrongdoing addressed through a third party who has the power to punish, hold accountable, or reverse a decision imposed by the holder of power. … Moreover, in any social system the number of such “third parties” or higher authorities to find a fair solution is limited. … These obstacles mean that many abuses of power go unchecked…” (Tobore, 2023).
SUMMARY:
Power, high social status or big money can simultaneously:
(1) strengthen egocentric orientation;
(2) reduce empathy or dehumanize others;
(3) erode internal moral constraints.
(4) create a thirst for more.
It is these components that underlie many automatic and often unconscious decisions in situations of corruption, irresponsibility and corporate practices.
2. WAR AND GEOECONOMIC CONFRONTATION
RISK No. 1 and 5 in terms of severity of consequences (severity) for the next 2 years (GRR 2026)
NARRATIVE (How we used to explain it):
We believe that wars start because of competition for resources, political ambitions or ideological differences. The public believes that war is an institutional dysfunction that can be avoided through diplomacy, economic sanctions or appeals to humanity.
However, organized intergroup violence remains a persistent constant in human behavior, resistant to cultural change and political efforts to pacify.
REAL REASON – SAPIEN PROBLEM:
Personal benefit
2.1. War is often a biologically rational strategy from the point of view of an individual or group, where aggression is seen as an effective way to gain status or gain resources, despite the damage to society or the species.
“Our evolutionarily shaped coalition psychology may include a set of different evolutionarily shaped heuristics specifically designed for offensive and defensive coalition aggression. ... Just one simple signal of intergroup conflict activates a whole complex of motivational and inferential outputs from adaptive psychological mechanisms designed to organize and focus group members in conditions of conflict. … In offensive aggression, benefits are distributed asymmetrically and often privately among participants, and so the relevant consideration in this domain becomes personal benefit rather than group benefit. … Thus, the first two hypotheses propose that the calibration of behavioral regulatory mechanisms in the brain associated with participation in coalition aggression will depend on the domain of aggression: in the offensive, willingness to participate should be predicted by perceived personal benefit, whereas in the defensive, by the group benefit (Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively)” (Lopez, 2017, my translation).
2.2. Dehumanization may reduce psychological barriers to violence
“We tend to attribute uniquely human qualities to members of our species—for example, a “private” mental life that includes thoughts, desires, and emotions (Harris, 2017). Dehumanization means a failure to spontaneously attribute such mental life to another person, as a result of which he/she begins to be related to an entity that is “less than human.” Although we have an aversion to harming other people, this aversion is weaker towards non-human entities, making violence towards dehumanized people possible. A dehumanizing perspective can extend to entire outgroups, and some of the worst examples of mass violence in human history have occurred in such contexts. For example, the US Constitution valued African slaves as “three-fifths” of a person (Goff et al., 2008), and Nazi propaganda called Jews vermin (Herf, 2008). Today, the media continues to overtly portray some minorities—such as immigrants and refugees—using dehumanizing language (Esses et al., 2013)” (Lantos & Molenberghs, 2021, my translation).
Dehumanization can be triggered and reinforced by perceived intergroup threat, uncertainty, public rhetoric, media framing (outgroup blaming, dehumanizing language), and practices of objectification and instrumentalization of people (e.g., “economic value appropriation,” purchasing, or valuing people) that shift perceptions of a person toward being “not fully human” and thereby facilitate group-level harm.
Uncertainty refers to “information fog”: many conflicting signals, no trusted sources or rules, difficulty in distinguishing real news from rumors. This is especially true today in conditions when individual political leaders and state communication apparatuses systematically disseminate deliberately false statements, use situational changes in interpretative frames and discredit independent sources. This style of communication increases subjective uncertainty and facilitates the construction of an image of a threatening outgroup.
2.3. Deontic Dissociation (Sacred Values)
In the context of intergroup conflict, disputed issues such as territory or national rights (e.g., Iran's right to a nuclear program or refugees' right of return) may be perceived as “sacred values” (Atran & Ginges, 2012). The processing of such values is dissociated from the utilitarian calculus systems that evaluate benefits and costs (vmPFC, striatum/nucleus accumbens, and parietal cortex). Instead, activity in the left parietotemporal junction (TPJ) and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) increases, which is associated with processing of deontic rules (rules of duty, right/wrong categories). When sacred value is violated, activity in the amygdala increases, reflecting emotional arousal (Berns et al., 2012). As a result, offers of material compensation or peace in exchange for concessions may be ignored by the benefit evaluation system and often provoke a “backfire effect”—an outburst of anger and moral opposition to the deal (Atran & Ginges, 2012).
3. CLIMATE COLLAPSE AND DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION OF THE BIOSPHERE
RISK No. 1, 2 and 3 in terms of severity of consequences (severity) for the next 10 years according to the Global Risk Report 2026).** That is, even higher than the severity of consequences due to the risks of AI and geo-economic confrontations.
NARRATIVE (How we used to explain it):
The reasons are considered to be economic interests, political inertia, lack of information or the complexity of the green transition. However, it is assumed that, given enough data, society will rationally change course.
However, inaction in the face of biosphere collapse is not “moral weakness”, but a systemic failure of the biological equipment of Homo Sapiens.
REAL REASON – SAPIEN PROBLEM:
3.1. Depreciation of the future
Concern for one's own survival in the long term is poorly supported by automatic ancient instincts and requires resource-intensive cognitive work. This biological gap explains a fundamental problem that we see everywhere in reality: the chronic dominance of short-term strategies over long-term interests.
Activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) when thinking about oneself “10 years from now” was significantly reduced compared with activity when thinking about oneself “in the present.” The magnitude of the neural difference ("Me now" - "Me in 10 years") in the rACC is positively related to temporal discounting (parameter k): the larger this neural gap, the stronger the devaluation of future rewards (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009). Moreover, activation in vMPFC when thinking about one's future self “1 year from now” is almost identical to that observed when thinking about a stranger “in the present” (Mitchell et al., 2011).
3.2. Threat System Sensory Blindness (Evolutionary Mismatch)
Survival circuits in humans detect key trigger stimuli and, based on them, trigger protective behavioral reactions and physiological mobilization (LeDoux, 2015). Threats that cannot be directly perceived/sensed as a risk object may be less well matched to the trigger stimulus format and may elicit weaker automatic mobilization.
Climate change is just such a threat: it is a slow, cumulative and largely “invisible” process. However, general climate knowledge may not translate into a personalized sense of risk (van der Linden, 2015). The time-delayed, abstract, and often statistical nature of global warming risks does not evoke strong visceral (body-emotional) reactions (Weber, 2006).
3.3. Pleasure trap (satiation system dysfunction):
The reward system has evolved in conditions of resource scarcity and does not have a reliable “saturation” mechanism when interacting with modern super-incentives. The accumulation of resources is maintained unnecessarily, and attempts at conscious self-restraint come into conflict with ancient subcortical drivers.
Dopaminergic reward circuits support reinforcement learning. With a repeated reward, the dopamine response weakens to the reward itself and shifts to conditioned predictor signals (conditioned “cues”) that anticipate the receipt of the reward. This enhances the motivation to search and consume in response to “cues” even when the physiological need is no longer present (for example, feeding in well-fed animals). A decrease in dopamine signaling in the striatum is indicated, including a decrease in D2 receptors. Reduced striatal D2 receptors have been associated with compulsive eating in animals, as well as reduced metabolic activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in humans, which has been interpreted as a possible mechanism for compulsivity/hyperphagia in weakened OFC/ACC control (Volkow et al., 2011).
In the modern environment of light “overstimuli,” this mechanism maintains the allostatic cycle: the subjective value of rewards decreases and larger “doses/portions” are required for comparable satisfaction, which is associated with addictive behavior (Sterling, 2012).
3.4. "Tragedy of the commons" and asymmetry of incentives
If the resource is common and access to it is not limited, then the rational behavior of individual participants (“taking a little more for their own benefit”) leads to systematic overconsumption and, ultimately, to the degradation or destruction of the common resource, because the benefit is individual, and the damage is shared among everyone (Hardin, 1968).
Smaller groups tend to be more successful than larger groups
With incentive asymmetries, small groups (e.g., a corporation) successfully exploit large ones (e.g., the population, the state, the environment), and not vice versa: “Unless the number of individuals is very small, or unless there is coercion or some other special mechanism forcing individuals to act in their common interests, rational, selfish individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 1965).
In other words, if the benefits of a decision are concentrated among a small number of players and the costs are dispersed across the majority, the majority has a chronic collective action problem and systematically loses to organized minorities.
3.5. Fading compassion in the face of large-scale threats:
In a rational world, as threats to life increase in magnitude, potential efforts to prevent harm should increase proportionately (Slovic, 2007, Västfjäll et al., 2014). However, as the number of victims increases, affective involvement and willingness to act often, on the contrary, decrease.
“The ability to empathize with people in need appears to be limited, and this form of compassion fatigue can lead to apathy and inaction, which is consistent with what is repeatedly observed in responses to many large-scale humanitarian and environmental disasters” (Västfjäll et al., 2014).
“…compassion and therefore public concern often decreases rather than increases in the face of larger threats… As the number of people in need increases, affective experiences and actions may begin to wane” (Västfjäll et al., 2014).
SUMMARY:
Climate change and ecocide simultaneously fall into several defects of the Sapiens system:
(1) The future is poorly felt and has less significance;
(2) The threat system does not sense complex and abstract threats;
(3) The self-restraint mechanism does not work well;
(4) The significance of many other people, and especially people of the future, tends to be minimal.
4. CORRUPTION: CAPITALISM AS A KEY RISK FACTOR FOR HEALTH AND ECOLOGY
NARRATIVE (How we used to explain it):
The market “simply meets demand”: people choose freely, businesses legally sell what they buy, regulators ensure the safety of consumers and the environment, and other harms are resolved by informing the consumer.
«…salespeople have prima facie duties to: (1) warn customers of potential hazards; (2) refrain from lying and deception; (3) fully and honestly answer questions about what they are selling (insofar as their knowledge and time constraints permit); and (4) refrain from steering customers toward purchases they have reason to think will be harmful to customers (Carson, 2001).
EMPIRICAL DATA (How it happens in practice):
The commercial environment systematically exploits the vulnerabilities of human neurobiology and biases choice towards short-term personal gain for beneficiaries, even when the result is significant harm to consumer health or the environment.
This often occurs in symbiosis with corruption: government agencies become the target of “capture,” a process in which regulated groups use regulatory authorities to their advantage (Bandura et al., 2000; Carpenter & Moss, 2014).
As a result, destructive actions can be rewarded, since stock growth depends on expected profits, and not on the effect on society.
“Every shareholder wants three things: a) To be as rich as possible, that is, to maximize his current wealth. b) Convert this wealth into the most desirable time profile of consumption - either by borrowing to spend now or by investing to spend later. c) Manage the risk characteristics of this consumption plan. How, then, can a financial manager help the firm's shareholders? There is only one way: increase their wealth. This means increasing the market value of the firm and the current price of its shares” (one of the most cited textbooks on corporate finance, Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010, my translation).
In a sample of corporate professionals selected by companies for management development programs (mainly managers and top managers), the proportion of people with very high psychopathic scores is approximately 5 times higher than in the general population (Babiak et al., 2010).
“Organizations rarely use measures of psychopathology except in special cases, such as hiring critical public safety personnel (e.g., police, firefighters, nuclear power plant operators)” (Babiak et al., 2010).
Capitalism is not just an economic model, but a highly efficient algorithm that has learned to “hack” human biology for the sake of profit.
REAL REASON – SAPIEN PROBLEM:
4.1. Self-interest and morality
In situations where monetary gain is fraught with moral conflict, people are more likely to accept immoral gains if they themselves are the beneficiary. This effect is explained by the fact that when making decisions in one’s own interests, the moral “price” receives less weight in the subjective assessment of the proposal, that is, its restraining influence weakens.
“Immoral behavior often involves weighing the violation of a moral norm against the maximization of personal gain...a higher monetary gain...made participants more likely to accept \[immoral\] offers, while a \[higher\] moral cost had the opposite effect...." (Qu et al., 2020, my translation)
The weight of the “moral price” was devalued when it came to one’s own benefit:
“Participants were more likely to receive ill-gotten gains for themselves rather than for the charity, reflecting a devaluation of the moral costs of making decisions in their own best interests. The subjective value of an immoral proposal, calculated as the linear sum of weighted monetary benefits and moral costs, recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC).”
In situations where monetary gain is coupled with a moral conflict, people are more likely to agree to obtain “immoral” profits when the beneficiary is themselves. This effect is explained by a reduced weight of moral cost in the subjective valuation of the offer when deciding for one’s own interests, meaning that its deterrent influence is weakened.
“Immoral behavior often consists of weighing transgression of a moral norm against maximizing personal profits… higher monetary gain… made participants more likely to accept \[immoral\] offers, whereas the moral cost showed the opposite effect …” (Qu et al., 2020).
The weight of the ‘moral cost’ was devalued when the decision concerned one’s own benefit:
«Participants were more willing to obtain ill-gotten profits for themselves than for a charity, driven by a devaluation of the moral cost when deciding for their own interests. The subjective value of an immoral offer, computed as a linear summation of the weighed monetary gain and moral cost, recruited the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (PFC)» (Qu et al., 2020).
“The present findings also provide a computational account and direct support for the theory of self-concept maintenance (Aronson, 1969; Mazar et al., 2008), which, until this study, has only been tested without computational modeling. This theory proposes that individuals generally value morality (e.g. honesty), and therefore want to maintain this aspect of their self-concept (Greenwald, 1980; Sanitioso et al., 1990). Here, if a person fails to comply with his internal standards for morality by profiting himself with ill-gotten gains, he will need to negatively update his self-concept by decreasing the weight on the moral cost (Mazar et al., 2008)” (Qu et al., 2020).
4.2. Self-interest drives unethical behavior
“Can exposure to money alone corrupt morality?... Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that exposure to money alone can trigger unethical intentions and behavior, and that the decision frame mediates this effect” (Kouchaki et al., 2013, my translation).
For example, in the “money” condition they lied about 2 times more often:
“Monetary priming resulted in approximately twice the rate of lying (46%) compared to control (22%).” (Kouchaki et al., 2013, my translation)
An unethical business decision (willingness to hire a candidate with confidential information) was approximately 38% more likely:
“(M\=5.13, SD\=2.46) were more likely to make a hiring decision...compared to the control condition (M\=3.71, SD\=2.44).” (Kouchaki et al., 2013, my translation)
“We further show that this effect is mediated by the “business decision frame” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Theoretically \[further supported empirically\] we argue that the business decision-making framework involves
objectification \[that is, turning people into objects\] of social relations (either with those who may be directly harmed, or, more generally, with other people in general) in a cost-benefit calculation,
in which self-interest is pursued to the detriment of the interests of others (that is, it assumes a focus on one's own gains and losses, to the large extent excluding benefits and costs for others);
thus it weakens social bonds and, consequently, the strength of moral motivation. Even in cases where there are no specific social relationships at stake, such objectification means that the person does not think about others in general; instead, he thinks about his own self-interest—maximizing his results—even if this means violating the moral rules that make up the fabric of society (Kouchaki et al., 2013, my translation).
Business decision frame: a focus on self-interest at the expense of others’ interests.
“Can mere exposure to money corrupt?... Together, the results of these studies demonstrate that mere exposure to money can trigger unethical intentions and behavior and that decision frame mediates this effect” (Kouchaki et al., 2013).
In the ‘money’ condition, participants lied about twice as often:
“The money prime led to twice as much lying (46%) as the control (22%).” (Kouchaki et al., 2013)
An unethical business decision (willingness to hire a candidate with confidential information) was about 38% more likely:
“(M \= 5.13, SD \= 2.46) were more likely to hire … than those in the control condition (M \= 3.71, SD \= 2.44)…” (Kouchaki et al., 2013)
“We further demonstrate that a ‘‘business decision frame’’ (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999) mediates this effect. Theoretically \[later supported empirically\], we argue that a business decision frame entails
objectification \[i.e., turning people into objects\] of social relationships (either those who stand to be directly harmed, or others more broadly construed) in a cost–benefit calculus in which
self-interest is pursued over others’ interests (i.e., it entails a focus on one’s gains and losses largely to the exclusion of benefits and costs to others);
as such, it weakens social bonds and thus the pull of morality. Even in instances when there is not a particular social relationship at stake, such objectification means that one does not think about others in general; rather, one thinks about self-interest in maximizing one’s outcomes even if it means violating the moral rules that constitute the fabric of society” (Kouchaki et al., 2013).
“Considering the significant role of money in business organizations and everyday life, the idea that subtle reminders of money elicit changes in morality has important implications. Our findings demonstrate that the mere presence of money, an often takenfor-granted and easily overlooked feature of our daily lives, can serve as a prompt for immoral behavior operating through a business decision frame. These findings suggest that money is a more insidious corrupting factor than previously appreciated, as mere, subtle exposure to money can be a corrupting influence” (Kouchaki et al., 2013).
4.3. Monetary incentives increase the likelihood of cheating
In sales negotiations, where the seller has an information advantage and a monetary incentive, the rate of deception reached 74%:
“Among 246 participants in the deception condition, 181 lied (74%)…” (Van Zant et al., 2022, my translation).
In strategic interactions with cash payments, where the more informed participant could guide the other's choice in his favor, the overall rate of deception reached 65.9%:
“If you add up cases of sophisticated deception with cases of simple deception, the overall frequency of deception reaches 65.9% (standard deviation 18.9) across all categories” (Volz et al., 2015, my translation).
Even with the same monetary incentive to cheat for both the control and money condition groups, an additional reminder about money increased the rate of cheating from 57.4% to 73.3%:
“…participants were more likely to cheat in the money condition (73.3%, 55 out of 75) than in the… control condition (57.4%, 39 out of 68; χ²(1, N=143)=4.04, p=0.044)…” (Gino & Mogilner, 2014, my translation)
In a sales negotiation where the seller has an informational advantage and a monetary incentive, the rate of deception reached 74%:
“Among 246 focal participants in the dishonesty opportunity condition, 181 lied (74%)…” (Van Zant et al., 2022).
In a strategic interaction with monetary payoffs, where the better-informed participant could influence the other participant’s choice in their own favor, the overall rate of deception reached 65.9%:
“Adding the cases of sophisticated deception to the cases of simple deception, the overall frequency of deception reaches 65.9% (SD \= 18.9) across all categories.” (Volz et al., 2015).
Even with the same monetary incentive to cheat in both the control group and the money-condition group, an additional reminder of money increased the rate of cheating from 57.4% to 73.3%:
“…participants were more likely to cheat in the money condition (73.3%, 55/75) than in … the control condition (57.4%, 39/68; χ2(1, N=143)=4.04, p=.044) …” (Gino & Mogilner, 2014).
“In particular, they reported lower levels of self-reflection in the money condition compared to … the control condition (p=.001) …” (Gino & Mogilner, 2014).
4.4. Monetary incentives reduce response to others' pain
The empathic neural response to another person's pain may be reduced compared to a situation without monetary reward. In the context of a corporate environment, this means that constant monetization and rewards can shift the balance towards a weaker empathic response, even without a conscious intention to ignore the harm caused.
“…there was a greater brain empathy response to others’ pain when they received no reward than when they received a large reward” (Xiuyan Guo et al., 2012, my translation).
4.5. Money as a substitute for social acceptance
“People often get what they want from the social system, and this process is facilitated by social popularity or the presence of money. Therefore, money may perhaps act as a substitute for social acceptance, providing the ability to benefit from the social system. Moreover, previous research has indicated that responses to physical pain and social suffering share common underlying mechanisms. Six studies tested the relationships between money reminders, social exclusion, and physical pain. Interpersonal rejection and physical pain caused increased desire for money. Handling money (compared to handling paper) reduced distress due to social exclusion and reduced physical pain from immersion in hot water. However, being reminded that a person had spent money increased both social distress and physical pain” (Zhou et al., 2009, my translation).
"People often get what they want from the social system, and that process is aided by social popularity or by having money. Money can thus possibly substitute for social acceptance in conferring the ability to obtain benefits from the social system. Moreover, past work has suggested that responses to physical pain and social distress share common underlying mechanisms. Six studies relationships among reminders of money, social exclusion, and physical pain. Interpersonal rejection and physical pain caused desire for money to increase. Handling money (compared with handling paper) reduced distress over social exclusion and diminished the physical pain of immersion in hot water. Being reminded of having spent money, however, intensified both social distress and physical pain” (Zhou et al., 2009).
"Eisenberger and colleagues showed that a reduction in status resulting from being left out of an activity lit up the same regions of the brain as physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 2003)." (Rock, 2008). Here, “being left out of an activity” refers to being excluded from a shared task or event (not invited, ignored, or not allowed to participate).
“…the reduction in status due to exclusion from activity fired up the same brain regions as physical pain” (Eisenberger et al., 2003)” (Rock, 2008). By exclusion from activity we mean, for example, exclusion from a common cause or event (they are not invited, they are ignored, they are not allowed to participate).
“…money priming did not have a significant impact on willingness to act sustainably, but it did cause participants to distribute points less prosocially and report lower social connectedness than individuals in the control condition. While effects were smaller than those reported in Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006), this study still offers support for the detrimental impact of reminders of money on interpersonal relations” (Capaldi and Zelenski, 2015).
4.8. Moral Disconnection
Moral disengagement is the process by which people (and organizations) selectively “turn off” internal moral self-sanctions in order to engage in harmful or wrongful actions without feelings of guilt or personal discomfort (distress). This can be achieved through justification by “higher” goals (moral justification), disguise by euphemisms, or comparison with something more terrible (Bandura et al., 2000).
Additionally, barriers are reduced when the consequences of harm are ignored, distorted, or minimized (even to the point of discrediting evidence of harm) and when blame is applied to others (Bandura et al., 2000).
“Moral disengagement mechanisms allow otherwise decent people to commit violations without experiencing personal internal discomfort.” (Bandura et al., 2000, my translation).
“Previous research has shown that people can maintain a positive self-image despite harmful actions by manipulating the value of moral costs and personal benefits of choices, which allows the person to benefit from immoral actions while maintaining a positive self-perception...” (Siegel et al., 2022, my translation)
Rationalization, such as “if I refuse, it will not change anything - someone else will simply take my place” also falls into this toolkit, which in its meaning corresponds to the erosion and shifting of responsibility.
Dilution of responsibility:
In a group structure, where “there is more than one agent,” the sapiens experience a decrease in personal control over the outcome (sense of agency), even if it is objectively clear who caused the outcome. This is accompanied by a weakening of the neurophysiological marker of feedback processing, which is consistent with a weaker internal account of consequences and facilitates moral distancing from harm.
“The presence of another potential agent reduced participants' sense of agency... reduced the amplitude of feedback negativity... indicating weakened outcome monitoring" (Beyer et al., 2017, my translation).
Passing the buck:
Sapiens can also shift personal responsibility to management:
Authority and coercion reduce the sense of responsibility for actions. When performing an action “on orders,” the sapiens subjectively experiences less personal causality, which is measurable as an increase in the perceived distance between the action and the result. In parallel, neural processing of the results of one's own action is reduced, which makes submission more compatible with causing harm "without a full internal signal of responsibility."
“Experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram \[Blass, 2006; Milgram, 1963\], showed that obedience to orders can lead to extremely antisocial behavior. Under certain circumstances, most people could be coerced into causing perceived harm to others at levels that would normally be considered unacceptable” (Caspar et al., 2021, my translation).
“26 subjects completely obeyed the experimenter’s instructions and applied the maximum electric shock to the generator. 14 subjects interrupted the experiment at one point or another after the victim began to protest and refused to give further answers" (Milgram, 1963, my translation).
“With responsibility shifting, people perceive their actions as caused by social pressure or the orders of others, rather than as something for which they are personally responsible... Therefore, they are willing to do things that they themselves would normally reject if a “legitimate” authority accepts responsibility for the consequences of their actions” (Bandura et al., 2000, my translation).
“Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome... Interestingly, coercion also reduced neural processing of the results of one's own actions. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively perceive their actions as closer to passive movements than to completely voluntary actions” (Caspar et al., 2016, my translation).
4.4 Moral Disengagement
Moral disengagement is a process in which people (and organizations) selectively “switch off” internal moral self-sanctions in order to engage in harmful or wrongful actions without guilt or personal distress. This can be achieved by appealing to “higher” goals (moral justification), by masking actions with euphemistic language, or by comparing them with something even more severe (Bandura et al., 2000).
In addition, barriers are further reduced when the consequences of harm are ignored, distorted, or minimized (up to and including attempts to discredit evidence of the harm), and when blame is shifted onto others (Bandura et al., 2000).
“The mechanisms of moral disengagement enable otherwise considerate people to commit transgressive acts without experiencing personal distress” (Bandura et al., 2000).
“Past research has shown that people can maintain a positive self-image of themselves despite harmful actions by manipulating the value of the moral costs and personal benefits of the choice, allowing the individual to benefit from their immoral actions while maintaining a positive self-view …” (Siegel et al., 2022).
A rationalization such as “If I refuse, nothing will change — someone else will simply take my place” also falls within this repertoire and, in meaning, corresponds to diffusion and displacement of responsibility.
Diffusion of responsibility:
In a group structure where “the agent is not alone,” a Sapiens experiences a reduced subjective sense of personal control over the outcome (sense of agency), even when it is objectively clear who caused it. This is accompanied by a weakening of a neurophysiological marker of feedback processing, which is consistent with weaker internal tracking of consequences and facilitates moral distancing from harm.
Displacement of responsibility:
Sapiens may also shift personal responsibility onto leadership.
Authority and coercion reduce the felt responsibility for one’s actions. When acting “under orders,” Sapiens subjectively experiences lower personal causation, which is measurable as an increased perceived distance between an action and its outcome. In parallel, neural processing of the outcomes of one’s own actions is reduced, making obedience more compatible with inflicting harm “without a full internal signal of responsibility.”
“Experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram \[Blass, 2006; Milgram, 1963\] showed that obeying orders can lead to extreme antisocial behaviours. Under certain circumstances, a majority of individuals could be coerced into inflicting apparent harm to others at levels generally deemed unacceptable” (Caspar et al., 2021).
“26 Ss \[subjects\] obeyed the experimental commands fully, and administered the highest shock on the generator. 14 Ss \[subjects\] broke off the experiment at some point after the victim protested and refused to provide further answers” (Milgram, 1963).
«Under displacement of responsibility people view their actions as springing from the social pressures or dictates of others rather than as something for which they are personally responsible… Hence, they are willing to behave in ways they normally repudiate if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their actions…» (Bandura et al., 2000).
“Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome... Interestingly, coercion also reduced the neural processing of the outcomes of one’s own action. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements than fully voluntary actions” (Caspar et al., 2016).
4.9. Unidentifiable victim effect
When harm is presented impersonally, the motivation to help and “get involved” in the problem is usually weaker than when there is a specific, identifiable victim.
An example of anonymized data is statistics on deaths caused by sugary drinks, or the results of scientific studies on the toxicity of plastic.
«Behaviorally, subjects gave more to orphans depicted by photographs versus silhouettes, and their shift in preferences was mediated by photograph-induced feelings of positive arousal, but not negative arousal. Neurally, while photographs versus silhouettes elicited activity in widespread circuits associated with facial and affective processing, only nucleus accumbens activity predicted and could statistically account for increased donations» (Genevsky et al., 2013).
4.10. Limiting empathy and forward-looking acceptance as victims grow
When an event affects one person, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is involved more strongly and for longer than when the same event affects many. As the number of victims increases, sapiens often become insensitive.
“Evaluation of human lives is related to emotional experiences (self-esteem and psychophysiological indicators) and a decrease in compassion may begin with a second life under threat” (Västfjäll et al., 2014).
“We... often go numb when the number of victims increases... Using functional MRI, we showed that... the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is more strongly recruited when events happen to one person than when they happen to many... the mPFC may be a neural marker of why we feel indifferent to the suffering of large numbers of people" (Ye et al., 2020).
“As the number of people in need of help increases, the degree of compassion towards them... tends to decline... These results provide initial evidence that motivated emotion regulation leads to insensitivity to mass suffering” (Cameron & Payne, 2011).
OPERATING SYSTEM: ILLUSION
CONSCIOUSNESS
Epigraph: “The consciousness of sapiens is not a permanent or integral part. It's more like a pilot who wakes up periodically, only to go back to sleep later."
Below are two mechanisms that simultaneously hide the problem from the sapiens himself and protect him in advance from accepting information about it. A typical reaction to criticism is “it’s about others, not me.” That is why it is not opinions that are important here, but experimental facts.
We have described only a small part of the vast library of scientific research.
AUTOMATISMS: MIMICRY UNDER CONSCIOUSNESS (INVISIBLE SCRIPT)
Automatisms are a class of background computational processes that control behavior on autopilot, bypassing conscious control.
Evolutionarily, these algorithms have been optimized for resource-scarce environments: they provide high responsiveness and radical energy savings, reducing the metabolic cost of decision making. However, today this mechanism shows signs of evolutionary mismatch.
The main problem is the architectural opacity and difficulty of restructuring them: the subject may by default be denied or difficult to access to detect or correct many such processes.
At the same time, these patterns are prone to recursive self-reproduction even with negative consequences from the point of view of consciousness, often reinforcing destructive or ineffective scenarios.
The vast majority of sapiens know little about the automatisms operating in their brains. Therefore, there is a strong belief (or the opposite belief is not generally accepted) that since sapiens are intelligent, then by default they are both conscious and rational. However, the facts show that neither one nor the other is true. The presence of reason as an option does not mean that it is used, much less controlled.
Every time automatism is triggered, it takes up some portion of reality (feelings, actions or thoughts), leaving less space for consciousness (your “I”). Most processes, even cognitive ones, occur unconsciously. Consciousness lives in a relatively small area, in the illusion that it controls everything else, while in fact it is often only a servant or is completely absent.
“...most of a person's daily life is determined not by his conscious intentions and deliberate choices, but by mental processes that are triggered by features of the environment and operate outside of conscious perception and control...” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, my translation)
Being confident in the rationality of their actions, people usually have strong opinions about their own preferences and decisions... (Sagana et al., 2014, my translation).
Examples
Even when a stimulus is fully visible and noticeable, sapiens may not register it if attention is occupied by another task. This is not “inattention of character”, but the effect of limited attentional bandwidth: perception is not a continuous video recording of reality, and the “obvious” may not be included in the report.
Reality filtering is built into the architecture of attention. If attention is occupied with a single goal, then some of the fully available sensory data systematically does not come into awareness. This means: even with sincere confidence “I would definitely notice,” a person often simply does not have access to what happened to him and, therefore, can make incorrect judgments.
“Of all 192 observers in all conditions, 54% noticed the unexpected event, and 46% did not notice* the unexpected event, demonstrating a significant level of persistent inattentional blindness to the dynamic event... ...even in the “opaque” condition, a significant proportion of observers (33%) did not report* the event, despite its visibility and repeated questions about it” (Simons & Chabris, 1999, my translation).
“People often fail to notice a salient but unexpected object when they are engaged in a task... ...Inattentive blindness is a by-product of attentional selection and results in a failure to detect a fully visible but task-irrelevant object” (Kreitz et al., 2015).
“People also fail to notice objects that are close to or even overlapping with objects of attention...” (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2000; Kreitz et al., 2015).
In addition, a significant proportion of everyday actions are triggered by habitual contextual cues and occur without conscious participation, which creates the illusion that sapiens are “always conscious” or “acting on purpose,” although much of the behavior is controlled by automatisms.
“...one study using hourly self-reports of behavior estimated that about 40% of all daily actions are driven by habit without conscious deliberation****... ...This is likely an underestimate because self-reports do not capture automatic behavior well.” (Giusti et al., 2021, my translation).
“Mind wandering was observed in 46.9% of measurements... In conclusion: a wandering mind is an unhappy mind.” (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010, my translation)
«Cognitive processes that require vigilance, model-based lookahead, or extensive utilization of attention or working memory are said to incur a cost (Kool et al., 2010), described as aversive (McGuire and Botvinick, 2010), or characterized as computationally expensive (Redish, 2013). General avoidance of such processes makes us “lazy organisms” (McGuire, 1969) and “cognitive misers” (Taylor, 1981), who in many circumstances would rather use “fast and frugal” heuristics (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) or habits (Redish, 2013) than “intrinsically costly” deliberative thought (Kool and Botvinick, 2014). Echoing Solomon's “law of least effort” (Solomon, 1948), Balle suggested that humans follow a “law of least mental effort” (Balle, 2002), always seeking the least cognitively expensive way of achieving a goal» (Christie & Schrater, 2015).
“Cognitive processes that require vigilance, model-based prediction, or intensive use of attention or working memory are considered costly (Kool et al., 2010), described as aversive (unpleasant) (McGuire and Botvinick, 2010), or characterized as computationally expensive (Redish, 2013). General avoidance of such processes makes us “lazy organisms” (McGuire, 2013). 1969) and “cognitive misers” (Taylor, 1981), who in many circumstances will prefer to use “fast and frugal” heuristics (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) or habits (Redish, 2013) rather than “intrinsically costly” rational thinking (Kool and Botvinick, 2014).
Echoing Solomon's “law of least effort” (Solomon, 1948), Balle proposed that people follow the “law of least mental effort” (Balle, 2002), always seeking to find the least cognitively costly way to achieve a goal” (Christie & Schrater, 2015).
SYSTEMIC AVOIDANCE OF UNWANTED INFORMATION
Automatisms can covertly influence our perception of reality, understanding of cause-and-effect relationships, and reasoning.
Sapiens can, unnoticed, avoid certain thoughts or actions, for example, negative information. The defense is built not into the arguments, but into what reality the sapiens allows to be considered at all, and how he deals with what contradicts his self-image.
Selective Inattention and Cognitive Consequences Bias in the Corporate Environment:
“Additional ways of weakening self-deterring reactions operate by disregarding or distorting the consequences of action... they avoid facing the harm they cause or they minimize it. In addition to selective inattention and cognitive distortion of effects, the misrepresentation may involve active efforts to discredit evidence of the harm that is caused" (Bandura et al., 2000).
“Additional ways of weakening self-control reactions operate by ignoring or distorting the consequences of actions... (people) avoid confronting the harm caused or minimize it. In addition to selective inattention and cognitive distortion of consequences, distortion may involve active attempts to discredit evidence of harm” (Bandura et al., 2000, my translation).
An analytical review (over 100 scientific studies) summarizes theoretical and experimental evidence on information avoidance (Russell Golman, David Hagmann, and George Loewenstein):
1. Sapiens can choose not to know even when information is free and would improve decisions: the point is that for sapiens information can have more than just instrumental value. The very fact of knowledge can bring a direct psychological effect - positive (calm, confirmation of self-esteem) or negative (anxiety, shame, threat to identity), besides whether knowledge helps make more accurate decisions.
“...information can directly enter into the agent's utility function. … This may create an incentive to avoid information even when it is useful, free, and independent of strategic considerations” (Golman et al., 2017).
«Information avoidance can also lead, or at least “license,” people to take selfish or immoral actions (or fail to take altruistic actions), as highlighted by the research on «moral wiggle room» (Dana et al., 2007; Golman et al., 2017).
“Information avoidance can also lead, or at least “permit,” people to engage in selfish or immoral acts (or fail to engage in altruistic acts), as research on “moral ambiguity” suggests (Dana et al., 2007; Golman et al., 2017).
3. Denying bad signals about yourself
If unpleasant information about oneself is nevertheless received, a processing asymmetry is observed: negative signals are less well integrated into beliefs and the willingness to receive additional information decreases, while “good news” is processed closer to the normative model.
“Participants who received negative feedback did not ‘consider’ the strength of these cues... and exhibited avoidance of new information. … In response to good news, the conclusions followed Bayes' rule much more closely…” (Eil & Rao, 2011, my translation).
Examples of consequences:
1. Individual (for a person)
Deterioration of decisions due to loss of useful information: a person deliberately “does not look” at feedback or facts that could improve the choice:
Stock market investors who do not look at the value of their portfolio when the market falls. Teachers who don't read teaching evaluations. (Sicherman et al., 2016).
Tendency to avoid and discount disconfirming information:
“…people accept ineffective medical treatments (and then judge them to be more effective than they actually are) (Nickerson 1998)…
“Researchers suffering from confirmation bias may rationalize failed experiments (Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2011)” (Golman et al. 2017).
2. Social (for society)
Spread of contagious diseases:
“Avoiding medical testing for contagious diseases such as AIDS can contribute to the spread of these diseases. … out of fear of receiving a positive diagnosis, this type of information avoidance imposes a negative externality on others (Caplin and Eliaz 2003)” (Golman et al., 2017, my translation).
Groupthink and collective bubbles:
In groups, avoiding information helps maintain shared (even irrational) belief. At the scale of markets, collective misconceptions lead to “irrational optimism,” bubbles and panics (Janis, 1972); Benabou, 2013; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Shiller, 2005, Golman et al., 2017).
Media Shift and Polarization of Politics:
In competing for more readers and viewers, media outlets have an incentive to provide biased coverage that matches the perspective of their target audience. This can increase polarization in society (Golman et al., 2017).
Political polarization:
In a polarized environment, partisan signals drown out balanced arguments. People not only form opinions on weaker evidence, but also believe that arguments supported by those who share their position are actually stronger; therefore, they rationalize their refusal to listen to opposing arguments (Golman et al., 2017).
Climate change denial:
“Denial of the reality of climate change makes it ... difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to implement policies to reduce such emissions. Denying scientific consensus almost by definition requires information avoidance (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman, 2011; Marshall, 2014; Golman et al., 2017).
Ethical violations supported by "unwillingness to know", "plausible deniability" and "distributed ignorance":
“Bazerman and Sezer (2016) note that with the revelation of widespread unethical behavior—from Bernie Madoff to FIFA corruption—it is difficult to imagine how unethical behavior could have been overlooked by so many. … However, in such ambiguous cases, people may be motivated not to look closely to avoid unearthing potentially unethical behavior—an illustration of what they call “bounded ethicality.” … By not collecting information, managers maintain “plausible deniability” in case unethical behavior is discovered (Dana 2006; Simon 2005). … Heimer (2012) suggests that organizations may deliberately fragment tasks and build bureaucratic barriers to maintain such “distributed ignorance” (Golman et al., 2017, my translation).
RATINALIZATION: FAST GENIUS
Rationalization is not a rare “lie to oneself”, but a systemic mechanism. When decisions have already been made by automatic mechanisms, consciousness can act as a module of legitimation rather than as a source of causality. That is, subjective explanations for the reasons for choice may be post hoc rationalizations, which impairs learning from errors (they go unnoticed or underestimated) and supports the repetition of problematic or ineffective behavior.
Sapiens may not notice the discrepancy between his own intention and what actually happened, but at the same time he confidently provides “reasons” (to himself or others), as if he had direct access to his own reasons for choice. This creates a stable defense against the recognition of automatisms: even when behavior has been replaced or distorted, the subjective feeling of “I decided so” is preserved, and the explanation is completed after the fact. The feeling of control and understanding of causes is often illusory.
“Ordinary people often think that a person is constantly aware of the reasons that guide his decisions. In fact, the ability to correlate the outcome of our choices with our intentions is important for adaptive behavior (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004; Sagana et al., 2014, my translation).
“With confidence in the rationality of their actions, people tend to have strong opinions about their own preferences and decisions. However, recent evidence suggests that people are poor at noticing deviations from their choices” (Sagana et al., 2014, my translation).
GENERATION OF EXPLANATIONS AFTER THE FACT
Sapiens often fails to notice that the result of his choice has been changed, and at the same time he can confidently explain “why he chose this”, even if in fact he was shown the opposite option. This is associated with confabulation (composing plausible explanations after the fact).
“Participants did not notice obvious discrepancies between their intended choice and the outcome they were presented with, but still gave “introspective” explanations for why they chose as they did (Hall, L & Johansson, P., 2005, my translation).
“Everyone has distortions but me” as an example of built-in protection:
When people were asked if they thought they would have noticed the substitution, 80-90% responded that “yes, they would have noticed.” Then, when analyzing the experiment, they were surprised and did not believe (Hall & Johansson, 2009, my translation).
“Biases are perpetuated when people believe that they themselves are free from them, while others are guilty of them... participants attributed more biases to others than to themselves... this was evident across all demographic groups” (Wang & Jeon, 2020).
This is a metacognitive asymmetry: a person is better at recognizing distortions and biases in others, and this is why he tends to perceive criticism as an “unfair attack” rather than a signal of error. In terms of rationalization, this is immunity to self-diagnosis: the defense system maintains the feeling “this is not about me,” even if the person admits that “people in general” are prone to this or that illusion or automatism.
Examples
When tasting in a supermarket, a person was given the opposite option and asked to explain the reasons for his choice - people detected no more than a third of such substitutions, building plausible explanations for the product that they did not choose (rejected). This happened even with a strong difference in tastes.
“Strikingly, people detected no more than a third of all such “stunt” samples. Even when we substituted such markedly different flavors—spicy “cinnamon and apple” for bitter grapefruit jam—participants noticed less than half of all substitutions” (Hall & Johansson, 2009, my translation)
In another experiment, people chose faces - 75% did not notice the discrepancy when substituting and explained the “reasons” for the choice:
“...our participants give us verbal explanations for choices they have never made...in 75% of trials, our participants did not notice the inconsistency, even offering “reasons” for their “choices”” (Hall & Johansson, 2009, my translation).
Similar effects have been observed in political surveys, online product selection, and even housing choices (Hall & Johansson, 2009).
ANCHOR EFFECT
This is a cognitive automaticity in which the first number or “landmark” seen becomes a reference point and systematically biases subsequent judgments and decisions, even if the landmark is random or irrelevant. The correction usually turns out to be insufficient, so the final judgments are “pulled” towards the anchor.
Professionals systematically “anchor” and yet deny it. This is important precisely as a demonstration: automatism not only influences the decision, but is also masked by rationalization.
1. Real estate: anchoring in value assessment and “blindness” to one’s own automaticity
The real estate market is an exemplary area because it has professional standards, expertise and “normatively correct” valuation strategies. However, experts may demonstrate a measurable shift in ratings due to an anchor (such as ad prices) while denying that they used the anchor as a factor.
“The anchoring index reached 46%. … Anchoring can occur unconsciously, and this effect is very difficult to get rid of” (Kazak, 2026, my translation).
“Professional participants categorically rejected the use of bid price...professionals are subject to decision bias...and professionals are less likely than nonprofessionals to admit this...” (Northcraft & Neale, 1987, my translation).
2. Meta-analysis: “anchoring” in legal decisions
In legal decision-making, anchoring means that a starting number (for example, a party's "request", a recommendation, a precedent figure) is capable of causally shifting the final quantitative estimate (for example, the deadline or amount of payment). The meta-analysis shows that the effect is robust and reproducible**, and persists even in the presence of control conditions.
“We found that even legal experts are susceptible to the anchoring effect. … The anchoring effect was large… quantitative decisions in law (for example, decisions on punishment) are subject to anchoring effects, and these effects are very stable” (Bystranowski et al., 2021, my translation).
SUNK COSTS AND ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT
Rationalization in this context is the systematic bias of subsequent decisions in favor of continuing on the chosen course because of costs already incurred and the need to maintain the coherence or validity of the previous choice. This behavior is considered irrational in a normative (economic) sense because sunk costs do not change from the current decision and, therefore, should not be included in the marginal calculation of “continue vs. stop". However, they do empirically predict propensity to continue.
“Escalation of commitment (or “escalation”) is the tendency of decision makers to continue pursuing a failed course of action” (Brockner, 1992).
SUNK-COST EFFECT AND ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT
Rationalization denotes a systematic shift in subsequent choices toward continuing a course of action because prior investments must be “made sense of” and the initial decision must be defensible. This pattern is normatively irrational under standard economic decision rules because sunk costs do not vary with the current choice and therefore should not enter marginal “continue vs. stop” evaluations; yet empirically, prior investment predicts persistence.
«Escalating commitment (or escalation) refers to the tendency for decision makers to persist with failing courses of action» (Brockner, 1992).
«The sunk cost effect is manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made... those who had incurred a sunk cost inflated their estimate of how likely a project was to succeed compared to the estimates of the same project by those who had not incurred a sunk cost. The basic sunk cost finding that people will throw good money after bad... The sunk cost effect was not lessened by having taken prior courses in economics» (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
AUTO-LOCK
Confirmation instead of verification (selective exposure)
After preliminary selection, people often move on to confirmatory search: they systematically prefer and select information that supports an already accepted position, and avoid or discount information that contradicts it. This reduces internal conflict and maintains subjective confidence, but degrades the quality of decisions because warning signs and counterarguments are eliminated already at the data collection stage.
“Selective exposure to information is a central aspect of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964) and is defined as the tendency of individuals to expose themselves to information consistent with their beliefs and to avoid what is inconsistent. This phenomenon was long neglected because of a lack of empirical support for the phenomenon results, but has recently received renewed interest in work on decision-making related to assimilation bias (Fischer, Fischer, Aydin, and Frey, 2010; Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, and Frey, 2011)” (Bardin et al., 2018).
“Selective exposure to information is a central aspect of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964) and is defined as the tendency of people to expose themselves to information that is consistent with their beliefs and to avoid information that contradicts them” (Bardin et al., 2018, my translation).
Original (quote):
“Research on selective exposure to information consistently shows that, after having made a decision, people prefer supporting over conflicting information” (Jonas et al., 2001).
Translation (quote):
“Studies of selective information perception consistently show that after making a decision, people prefer confirmatory information to contradictory information” (Jonas et al., 2001, my translation).
Preference Shift
A person's reaction to a substituted outcome (what he said publicly and how he explained it) can shift future preferences to the point that the person begins to prefer the previously rejected alternative. This is associated with a self-feedback mechanism of the form: “I chose it and explained it, which means I like it” (Johansson et al., 2013).
Original (quote):
“According to cognitive dissonance theory, a discrepancy between preferences and actions may lead to the revaluation of preferences, increasing preference for the chosen options and decreasing for the rejected options. This phenomenon is known as the spreading of alternatives (SoA), which results in a choice-induced preference change (CIPC)" (Davydova et al., 2023) (cmu.edu)
Translation (quote):
“According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, the discrepancy between preferences and actions can lead to an overestimation of preferences: preference for the chosen option increases, and preference for the rejected option weakens. This phenomenon is known as “dilution of alternatives,” that is, a change in preferences caused by the very fact of choice” (Davydova et al., 2023, my translation). (cmu.edu)
Self-sustaining connection
There is evidence of a causal effect: when a person generates moral justifications for past actions, this may increase the likelihood of continuation and escalation of such actions. This makes the “defensive circuit” not just a cognitive error, but a self-reinforcing mechanism for deviant patterns.
“Engagement in moral rationalization causes subsequent continuation and reinforcement (escalation) of previous immoral behavior” (Mulder & van Dijk, 2020).
EXAMPLE OF SYNERGY
“Minimum effort selection” → Post-facto justification → Avoidance of inconvenient information \+ Selective search for confirmation → Repetition of the mechanism
These processes operate as a whole algorithm, often working bypassing consciousness.
Stealth and automaticity makes behavior resistant to correction: even in the presence of data and negative feedback, a person can not allow or redefine meanings in such a way as to maintain the integrity of self-image and comfort.
In total, these results support the thesis: automatisms and rationalization are not a “rare mistake”, but act as a universal mechanism that:
(1) allows for systematic triggering (the influence of context or emotions) even among experts. And can do it hidden.
(2) involves active avoidance of information even where the cost of error is high. And can do it hidden.
(3) is able to instill the feeling that the planned result has been achieved, even if a substitution has occurred. And can do it hidden.
Conclusion:
If a person is able to (a) after making a choice re-evaluate his preferences so that they coincide with the action already taken, and at the same time (b) distort information that could reveal the true reasons for the choice, then such rationalization becomes not “petty hooliganism”, but a systemic mechanism for maintaining errors, including such as corruption, short-term decisions and ignoring risks.
Epigraph:
The one they don't talk about
Throughout history he rules without being noticed.
Kings obeyed him, deciding the fate of nations. Boards of directors vote on his command. Presidents sign his orders, thinking that they are their decisions. He kills millions for the sake of quarterly profits - and it's legal. He's increasing fossil fuel subsidies while the planet is burning—and that's okay. He's driving an AI arms race when experts say the danger is unprecedented - and that's to be expected.
Who is he?
Summits are not being convened to stop it. Institutions are not created to defeat it. People gather only to discuss what he has already done. We build stands only to belatedly mourn the ruins he leaves behind. We are eternal prisoners of consequences. Because he commanded it.
Who is he?
In the laboratory, under sterile conditions, it is perfectly visible. But in the conference room, in the voting booth, at the supermarket counter, you can’t catch him. He's there. Always there. It's just that no one calls him by name.
Who is he?
For thousands of years the chosen ones have been shouting to us about him. Buddha. Socrates. Epictetus. We didn't hear.
Like a person who buys fast food, gasoline or cigarettes, he does it in inner silence - no one shouts in his face that he is buying illness and death for himself, and at the same time sponsoring them for others. Every day, with his own hands, he pays three times - with money, time, and suffering. In this silence everything always looks normal. Until the last moment.
After all, he convinced us that he is us.
Any of his actions is performed on your behalf.
Can you hear?
This is him - His Majesty Automatism.
He is not somewhere far away, he is in your head. He does not come when consciousness is absent, he is always in you. He is the Sapiens Problem.
And this is where the main tragedy lies: a person is ready to completely destroy and rebuild the entire world around him, just so as not to change himself.
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